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1.
Sense-data theories have attracted the attention of numerous philosophers in the 
previous century. However, despite their popularity, thinkers did not arrive at a 
consensus regarding the meaning of a sense-datum. If we were to define a sense-datum, 
we would, at best, be able to state that it refers to ‘a given’.
Although the meaning of a sense-datum is somewhat ambiguous, many 
philosophers use this term very casually. At the same time, philosophers in the 
twentieth century often identified a sense-datum as an idea, a concept that was used by 
philosophers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
In this regard, A. A. Luce, who was the opinion leader for Berkeley studies, 
stated the following:
Objects seen, touched, heard, tasted, or smelled, sensible qualities or things or 
ideas, sensation, sensa, or sense-data, call them what you please or what fashion 
dictates, they, one and all, when I perceive them, are in my mind, only in my 
mind, and are entirely distinct from my mind: and that, says Berkeley, is what I 
mean by existence in the human mind. (italics mine) (Luce, 1968: 285–286)
The key terms in the above extract are sensa and sense-data. In addition, there is 
already a problem with this extract. That is, sensa and sense-data have different 
implications1. In this case, what are the reasons for their casual use or for people using 
them depending on what is more fashionable? Strictly speaking, can sensa and sense-
data be used interchangeably? On the surface, the answer would undoubtedly be ‘No’. 
This is because in philosophical works, these terms always have a theory as their 
background and the meanings of the terms depend on the theory. If the background is 
ignored, there will be confusion regarding the actual meanings. Conversely, if we need 
to highlight the difference between the terms, we have only to show the differences 
between the standpoints of each theory. As stated earlier, Berkeley’s idea was not 
_____________________________
1 Sense-data may or may not be considered to be identical to a part of a physical object, while sensa are 
considered to be non-physical (Barnes, 1965: 143).
2 See my previous article (Toda, 2006b).
strictly identical to a sense-datum2. However, in this short paper, I will provide some 
considerations about the relation between Berkeley’s theory and the sense-data theories 
in order to reveal the influence of Berkeley’ theory on sense-data theorists.
2.
I will begin by stating a few points so that we can observe the similarity between 
Berkeley’s theory and the sense-data theories. When there is a problem regarding the 
nature of sense-data, one of the main issues to be considered is the relation between 
sense-data and the material body. Some researchers say that sense-data are identified 
with a material body or more strictly a part of the surface of that material body. G. E. 
Moore attempted to establish the truth in this statement, but eventually abandoned it. 
Bertrand Russell was also of this opinion initially. However, there was a difference 
between their positions. Moore’s was more realistic and Russell’s was more 
phenomenological. In this paper, I will first deal with the latter position.
From the phenomenological perspective, a material body is identified with a 
collection of perceived sense-data and sensibilia that will be perceived once several 
conditions are satisfied. The origin of this perspective can be traced to J. S. Mill. Some 
thinkers were of the opinion that this position was similar to that of Berkeley. Although 
he advocated idealism, Berkeley admitted that a material thing existed when no man 
perceived it. By such an insistence, he seemed to admit to the existence of sensibilia. 
Where or how do they exist? Berkeley replied, ‘In God’s mind’.
Hylas. Supposing you were annihilated, cannot you conceive it possible that 
things perceivable by sense may still exist?
Philonous. I can; but then it must be in another mind. When I deny sensible 
things an existence out of the mind, I do not mean my mind in particular, but all 
minds. Now, it is plain they have an existence exterior to my mind; since I find 
them by experience to be independent of it. There is therefore some other Mind 
wherein they exist, during the intervals between the times of my perceiving 
them: as likewise they did before my birth, and would do after my supposed 
annihilation. And, as the same is true with regard to all other finite created 
spirits, it necessarily follows there is an omnipresent eternal Mind, which knows 
and comprehends all things, and exhibits them to our view in such a manner, and 
according to such rules, as He Himself hath ordained, and are by us termed the 
laws of nature. (Berkeley, 1713: 230–231)
As shown by this argument, man perceives a thing actually and possibly. 
(However, a thing possibly perceived by man is actually perceived by God.) Therefore, 
these may appear to correspond to sense-data and sensibilia. However, there exists a 
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difference between them. In the above argument, Berkeley’s sensible things—that is, 
the ideas— do not form a part of the surface of a material body but the material body 
itself. In this argument, Berkeley’s aim is not to explain the formation of a concept of a 
material body. Nowhere has Berkeley stated that ideas form some part of the surface of 
a material body. For Berkeley, an idea is a material body itself as well as a sensible 
quality. With regard to this point, there is an important difference between Berkeley 
and Russell.
Russell’s definition that the thing of common sense may be identified with the 
whole class of its appearance was met with some opposition. It may be of use to refer 
to the following criticism by R. J. Hirst:
‘[A]ppearance’ is normally used to refer either to the fact that something appears 
or to how it appears, and so is not strictly complete in itself an appearance is 
always the appearance of something which appears. (Hirst, 1959: 77)
Moreover, Hirst pointed out that Russell’s definition is circular. This is because 
in Russel’s definition, ‘its’ is the thing of common sense. As a result, a thing defined 
appeared in the definition. On the other hand, Berkeley’s view on appearance is as 
follows:
Hylas. As for the difficulties other opinions may be liable to, those are out of the 
question. It is your business to defend your own opinion. Can anything be plainer 
than that you are for changing all things into ideas? You, I say, who are not 
ashamed to charge me with scepticism. This is so plain, there is no denying it.
Philonous. You mistake me. I am not for changing things into ideas, but rather 
ideas into things; since those immediate objects of perception, which, according 
to you, are only appearances of things, I take to be the real things themselves.
Hylas. Things! You may pretend what you please; but it is certain you leave us 
nothing but the empty forms of things, the outside only which strikes the senses.
Philonous. What you call the empty forms and outside of things seem to me the 
very things themselves. Nor are they empty or incomplete, otherwise than upon 
your supposition—that Matter is an essential part of all corporeal things. We 
both, therefore, agree in this, that we perceive only sensible forms: but herein we 
differ—you will have them to be empty appearances, I, real beings. In short, you 
do not trust your senses, I do.
This claim shows that for Berkeley, appearances—which Hylas refers to as 
ideas—are real things; it can also be said that Berkeley’s appearance is the same with a 
material body itself. Therefore, his argument is not circular in nature because he did not 
define the material body by ‘appearance’. For him, the thing of common sense is an 
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idea and an idea becomes an empty appearance only if it is ‘an idea of something that is 
not an idea’. This something is the material substance, the existence of which Berkeley 
denied. In this respect, Berkeley’s position is quite realistic or commonsensical, not 
phenomenological. Therefore, we can observe a similarity between this type of sense-
datum theory and Berkeley’s idealism; however, we cannot identify one with the other. 
In this case, what can be said about Moore’s realistic sense-datum theory? I will return 
to this question later.
3.
I would now like to focus on a linguistic sense-datum theory. A. J. Ayer was the 
representative promoter of this theory. Although it is rejected now, initially, many 
thinkers considered this theory to be the most sophisticated.
Ayer claimed that the perception of sense-data cannot be determined by 
empirical observation. He proceeded to say that this problem has nothing to do with the 
fact that a sense-datum theory is not factual but linguistic. In other words, according to 
him, the statement ‘We perceive sense-data’ is a substitute for the statement ‘We 
perceive a chair’. Since the former statement is useful for an analysis of the latter, Ayer 
believed that we should use the sense-datum language (Ayer, 1940).
It is a well known fact that this theory ended in failure. There were mainly two 
reasons for this: (1) the sense-datum language cannot be used to analyse our ordinary 
language and (2) a sense-datum theory has never been linguistic, but factual.
In this paper, I will focus on the second criticism. In the above quotation from 
Dialogues, Philonous said, “I am not for changing things into ideas, but rather ideas 
into things”. Moreover, in Principles, Berkeley considered the following linguistic 
criticism for his idealism:
But after all, say you, it sounds very harsh to say we eat and drink ideas, and are 
clothed with ideas. I acknowledge it does so—the word idea not being used in 
common discourse to signify the several combinations of sensible qualities 
which are called things; and it is certain that any expression which varies from 
the familiar use of language will seem harsh and ridiculous. But this doth not 
concern the truth of the proposition, which in other words is no more than to say, 
we are fed and clothed with those things which we perceive immediately by our 
senses. (Berkeley, 1710: sect. 38)
From this passage, it seems that Berkeley’s idea-language is a substitute for our 
ordinary language. However, this is not the case; his words should not be taken at face 
value. Moreover, it is possible that Berkeley himself does not believe this. There is one 
crucial difference—concerning ontological states—between Berkeley’s idea and the 
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thing of common sense. Even if a theorist can use his theory to explain the concept of 
the thing of common sense, it would not follow that his theory is commonsensical3. In 
other words, it should be understood that Berkeley attempts to explain the concept of a 
thing of common sense based on his idealism. By this act, he defends the 
commonsensical belief about a material body.
Ayer believed his sense-data to be linguistic in nature, but this was an incorrect 
assumption; on the other hand, Berkeley did not think his idea to be linguistic from the 
outset. Therefore, although there appears to be some similarity between sense-data and 
Berkeley’s idea, we cannot conclude that they are the same.
4.
Thus far, I have stressed the fact that Berkeley’s idea is not the same as sense-
datum. However, this is not the only point to be considered. On one hand, although 
Berkeley’s idealism and the sense-datum theory are not identical, we do notice some 
similarities between the two. In this section, I refer to another one of these interesting 
similarities.
With regard to this similarity, the theorist that comes to mind is C. D. Broad, a 
prominent sense-datum theorist. Broad denied the fact that a perceiver does not make 
an inference about a material thing based on sensa. He talks about the relation between 
a material thing and sensa, as follows:
The best analogy that we can offer to the relation between our sensing of a 
sensum and our perceiving a physical object is to be found in the case of reading 
a book in a familiar language. What interests us as a rule is the meaning of the 
printed words and not the peculiarities of the print. […] Sensa themselves ”cut 
no ice.” We therefore pass automatically from the sensum and its properties to 
judgments about the physical objects and its properties. (Broad, 1965: 96)
As I have shown in a previous article, in Berkeley’s theory of perception, it is by 
suggestion that we can perceive a material body. In this paper, I provide a short 
explanation of Berkeley’s theory of perception.
According to Berkeley, we perceive visual ideas first. These ideas are only a 
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_____________________________
3 This point can be observed in the so-called error theory. Projectivist colour theory states that we see 
colours on the surfaces of material things incidentally. However, the projectivists do not entirely deny our 
ordinary belief in colour. They admit to the practical value of our ordinary belief and attempt to explain 
why we come to have such a belief (Wright, 2003). In Berkeley’s case, at best, he provides such an 
explanation. I have attempted to bridge the gap between his idealism and his defence of common sense in 
another paper (Toda, 2006a).
diversity of colours and lights. In this stage, we cannot comprehend a percept as a 
material thing. Then, these visual ideas suggest to the mind tactual ideas, which are 
already experienced to be connected visual ideas. Further, when visual ideas are 
combined with tactual ideas, we establish our perception of a material body. Thus, 
‘suggestion’ plays an important role in the process of perception of a material body. 
Berkeley says that ‘suggestion’ is different from ‘inference’. The former is an 
unconscious mental faculty that makes perception immediate, while the latter is a 
conscious mental activity that makes perception mediate4.
‘Suggestion’ is derived from our ordinary linguistic usage. 
No sooner do we hear the words of a familiar language pronounced in our ears, 
but the ideas corresponding thereto present themselves to our minds: in the very 
same instant the sound and the meaning enter the understanding: So closely are 
they united that it is not in our power to keep out the one, except we exclude the 
other also. We even act in all respects as if we heard the very thoughts 
themselves. So likewise the secondary objects, or those which are only suggested 
by sight, do often more strongly affect us, and are more regarded than the proper 
objects of that sense…. (italics mine) (Berkeley, 1709: sect. 51)
Visual ideas are to tactual ideas what words are to their meanings. Similarly, the 
relation between sensa and material things is also the same. The most important 
similarity is that a signifying thing goes unnoticed but a signified thing gets noticed. Of 
course, there is a difference between the theories of Berkeley and Broad. As already 
mentioned, Berkeley’s ideas are not different from a material thing, while Broad’s 
sensa are. Broad assumes that sensa are non-physical. Therefore, although we can 
highlight several similarities between their theories, they cannot be considered to be 
identical.
Thus far, I have discussed some prominent sense-data theorists and drawn a 
contrast between them and Berkeley. There are, of course, still other sense-data theories 
and theorists. As we know, numerous debates have attempted to define the nature of 
sense-data. However, I would not go into the details of all these sense-data theories (To 
do so is beyond my scope.) However, since some theories are directly contrasting with 
Berkeley’s, I will see an exponent of them. For example, Price’s sense-datum theory 
differs significantly from Berkeley’s. Price denied the representative theory of 
perception; however, his theory can be said to be similar to it in that Price postulated 
74 Takefumi TODA
_____________________________
4 Therefore, an advocate of immediate perception often uses this concept. For example, Thomas Reid uses 
the concept of ‘suggestion’ from Berkeley (Reid, 1764).
that a physical object is distinct from a family of sense-data.
I had mentioned earlier that I would provide an explanation of Moore’s sense-
datum theory; strictly speaking, this is the very theory that Moore finally abandoned. I 
will examine this in the next section.
5.
In the sense-datum theory under consideration, sense-data are considered to be 
part of the surface of a material thing; this is often believed to be naïve realism. There 
is a drawback to this type of sense-datum theory. When I view a paper under normal 
conditions, I assume that I have a white sense-datum. And I again assume that someone 
switches on the lights in my room, illuminating my room with orange light. In this 
case, my white sense-datum will turn into an orange sense-datum, or the white sense-
datum will disappear and the orange sense-datum will appear. Therefore, the surface of 
the paper I am viewing will be white and orange. However, it is believed to be an 
inconsistency that the same thing is A and not-A. Further, let us look at another 
example. Assume that I am looking at a piece of paper with the naked eye under white 
light and another person is looking at the same paper with orange-tinted glasses. In this 
case, I have a white sense-datum and the other person has an orange sense-datum. 
Therefore, in this sense, the same piece of paper is simultaneously white and orange. 
This poses an inconsistency.
Due to these difficulties, thinkers either dismissed this type of sense-datum 
theory or modified it. However, if we were to address the sense-datum theory that has 
the most similarity with Berkeley’s theory, I think it would be this type of sense-datum 
theory. This is because both the theories are in accordance in terms of a relation 
between sense-data or ideas and a material thing. Both Berkeley and this type of sense-
datum theorist believe that what is immediately perceived is a thing itself or some parts 
of the surface of a material thing. Then, we may want to ask, ‘Did Berkeley’s theory 
lead to inconsistency?’ This is the serious problem that is difficult to answer. Therefore, 
I will not enter into a detailed discussion of it in this short paper; I will only make some 
comments.
First, I take up the case in which there are different colours under different types 
of lighting. This is the easiest case to understand. In this case, white and orange colours 
do not appear on paper at the same time. Therefore, even if the same paper has different 
colours at different times, it would not be inconsistent in the strict sense of the word. 
However, one might say, ‘Then, according to Berkeley, must we say that the white 
paper we saw changed to an orange paper?’
If the orange-tinted light is turned on, the colour of the paper would certainly 
have changed to orange. We would have to admit to this point, were we to take 
Berkeley’s theory seriously. Even if this is the case, we need not say that the white 
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paper changed to the orange paper. In other words, Berkeley could say that the white 
paper appeared to be orange under an orange-tinted light. This is because Berkeley 
believes that there are laws of nature at work in the world, and these are regulated for 
our ordinary lives. Further, our ordinary conceptions are well adapted to the laws of 
nature. A material body change or the change from a white paper to an orange paper 
with a change in light is not practical and does not coincide with our ordinary beliefs. 
So, even in Berkeley’s theory, we can say that a white paper is always white but looks 
orange under an orange-tinted light5.
Second, I take up the case in which a piece of white paper—seen with the naked 
eye—appears orange when seen by a man wearing orange-tinted glasses. This problem 
is more complicated than the former. Therefore, I will only provide the reader with a 
hint and discuss the answer in detail on another occasion.
If we consider this problem from an ontological perspective, it can be said that 
no idea will be viewed by two perceivers in the same manner; further, these ideas do 
not exist in the same place because they exist in the minds of each of the perceivers. 
This answer is not useful. In tackling this problem, if we rely on Berkeley’s idealism, 
we will miss the point. This is because when we see the surface of a material thing, we 
are considering the situation as commonsensical. Moreover, this solution will make 
Berkeley’ position not-commonsensical, which will be against his intention6. Therefore, 
we must consider this problem under a commonsensical situation, without relying on 
idealism.
The clue to solving this problem is to consider that Berkeley defends 
commonsense from the perspective of the perceiver. In other words, a situation is 
considered based on how the perceiver judges that situation by his own perspective. 
Now, let us observe a situation in which two perceivers look at the same piece of 
paper—one with the naked eye and the other with orange-tinted glasses. In this case, 
the perceiver looking at the paper with the naked eye cannot see the paper as being 
orange. He can only see a white paper. Undoubtedly, he can judge that the other 
perceiver with the orange-tinted glasses can see the paper as being orange. However, 
based on this fact, he does not judge that the other person sees an orange paper; rather, 
at best, he judges that the white paper appears orange to the other person. Therefore, 
for the perceiver himself, this situation does not result in an inconsistency. The 
inconsistency arises because we think of the situation from the point of view of God. I 
understand that this solution is too simplistic; in fact, it is dubious whether this is 
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5 For this problem, it is useful to refer to the article below (Atherton, 2003).
6 I can add yet another comment on this point. Assuming the commonsensical position, Berkeley answers in 
the affirmative with regard to the problem on whether many people see the same thing. Therefore, if we 
answer the present problem by means of idealism, the answer will not coincide with Berkeley’s answer.
actually a solution to the problem. Thus, the problem should be considered in further 
detail on other occasion7. 
6.
In this paper, I have considered some of the similarities (and differences) 
between Berkeley’s theory and the sense-data theories. Each sense-datum theory is 
similar to or differs from Berkeley’s in some respect or the other. This is an important 
point to be noted because sense-theorists do not necessarily look with favour at the 
ideal theories proposed by their ancestors. However, the similarities between the 
theories show that the modern thinkers were significantly influenced by their 
predecessors.
As we know, sense-datum theorists failed in their attempts. Their methods were 
certainly numerous and exhaustive. In this sense, their projects had merit. However, 
they failed to investigate the works of their ancestors more thoroughly. If they had 
properly evaluated the rich content of their ancestors’ theories, they might have 
attempted to search for different possibilities or enhance their methods further8. In the 
history of philosophy, similar arguments have often been repeated. We should not 
believe it to be natural that we progress more than past philosophers. Before we judge 
their theories as being of a good or poor quality, we must examine them completely and 
meticulously. This is the moral left to us by sense-datum theorists.
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